Does Smart Power of ASEAN Cooperation Influence Firm Value? Evidence from Geopolitical Perspective by Md. Salleh, Mohd Fairuz et al.
ŒCONOMICA 
 83 
 
 
Does Smart Power of ASEAN Cooperation Influence Firm Value? 
Evidence from Geopolitical Perspective 
 
Mohd Fairuz Md. Salleh
 1
, Wan Sallha, Yusoff
2
, Norida Basnan
3 
 
Abstract: This study examines the influence of the ASEAN cooperation on firm value. As far as the 
cooperation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is concerned, one aspect of 
geopolitical mechanisms is ASEAN‟s smart power which combines hard and soft power. This smart 
power is considered an important mechanism for corporate strategies. Any changes in geopolitical 
decision between the ASEAN members will affect firm value especially firms segmented in the 
ASEAN countries. From a geopolitical perspective and by using data from public listed firms in 
Malaysia that were actively traded in ASEAN countries from 2009 to 2013, the study examined the 
influence of hard power indicated by military power, and soft power which refers to material 
resources and social power in terms of the relationship of political elites. The study found that the soft 
power of the ASEAN cooperation is positively associated with firm value. In contrast, the social 
power of political elites is negatively related to firm value, while the hard power fails to show any 
influence. Overall, the evidence suggests that corporate strategies should consider the benefit of 
ASEAN‟s material resources and the risk of forging relationships with political elites when designing 
market penetration strategies. 
Keywords: Geopolitics; Firm Value; ASEAN Cooperation; Political Economy 
JEL Classification: F23 
 
1. Introduction  
Southeast Asia has long been recognized as an important region in the world‟s 
politics. The diversity of culture, language, and landscape throughout the region 
coupled with its wealthy natural resources make Southeast Asia significant to the 
economic prosperity of major economic powers (such as the United States of 
America).  
More recently, the US has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
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negotiation (Straits Times, 2014). The success of TPP will represent 40 percent of 
world GDP and one-third of total world trade. It is seen as a core political interest 
of the US to tap into Southeast Asian growth and enjoy the prosperity of the Asian 
market. As the world‟s second largest economy, China has also offered huge 
investment and trade opportunities to Southeast Asia countries. Besides the 
clashing interest between the US and China in the Southeast Asia region, the new 
model of Sino-Japan is another critical path to the Southeast Asia architecture 
(Straits Times, 2014). Both China and Japan have their own hierarchical 
worldviews, in that China provides market opportunities and Japan provides 
investment opportunities.   
Given the major powers‟ political games, it is crucial for the unity of ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nation) to strengthen the region as a new major 
power across the globe (Rajaratnam, 1992). Starting with the Bangkok Declaration 
in 1967, the establishment of ASEAN, and followed by Malaysia‟s first call for 
„neutralization of Southeast Asia‟ as an initiate Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN), formalized in the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration, ASEAN 
remains a key multilateral mechanism to promote regional cooperation in Southeast 
Asia.  
As a founding member of ASEAN, Malaysia has enjoyed substantial trade and 
investment flows. Based on an investment study in 2013, Malaysian companies had 
emerged as ASEAN leaders in several key sectors such as plantations, finance, and 
oil and gas (Yan, 2013). Malaysia‟s largest multinational companies have also 
provided unique investment opportunities for global investors to take advantage of 
ASEAN‟s growth. Any political decisions among ASEAN member countries and 
Asian major powers are important considerations at advancing national strategic 
interests. Many scholars in this area suggest that besides economic uncertainty, 
geopolitical uncertainty is a new important element to be taken into account in 
corporate decision making (e.g. Behrendt & Khanna, 2003; Reynaud & Vauday, 
2009; Teixeira & Dias, 2013). To provide a fundamental understanding on 
geopolitical influence on businesses in Southeast Asia, we raised two research 
questions. Does the ASEAN cooperation influence firm value of public listed firms 
in Malaysia? Which geopolitical components are significantly related to firm 
value?  
To answer the above questions, we have chosen Malaysia as our study setting as it 
is an active ASEAN member. Moreover, the distinctiveness of the Malaysian 
market, which is relationship-based as opposed to rule-based and the unique 
political structure with a multi-party system, may offer new interesting insights into 
the political economy as well as business and finance literature. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review 
the theoretical background and existing empirical literature as a basis for research 
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hypothesis development. This is then followed by the elaboration of data and 
research method. Finally, we discuss the results and conclude the paper. 
 
2. Geopolitics and Business in Malaysia  
Geopolitics is a multidisciplinary approach that studies the geographical, political, 
historical, strategic, and economic state in terms of boundaries and international 
structures (Flint, 2006). A Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922) 
defines geopolitics as the „geographical organism or phenomenon of space‟ and 
relates the power of state territories as a subject of studies. Post World War II, with 
the emergence of a world-economic system, modern geopolitics pioneered by 
Taylor (1994) had introduced hegemonic states as a subject of study. Nowadays, 
when market competition becomes more complex, most geopolitical intellectuals 
discuss issues related to hegemonic power of multilateral institutions and its impact 
on regional economics, finance, and business (Cohen, 2008).  
In order to understand the hegemonic power of ASEAN, we first relate the 
geopolitical phenomena with world system theory proposed by sociologist 
Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s. The theory suggests that the world is divided 
into core, semi-periphery, and periphery countries (Chirot & Hall, 1982). Core 
countries are dominant capitalist countries that have strong and independent 
military power, high technology of skill, and are capital intensive. The United 
States and Japan are examples of core countries. Periphery countries are commonly 
referred to as third-world countries and have less developed industries. They are 
low-skilled, highly labor-intensive, and dependent on core countries for capital 
aids. Within the ASEAN region, Cambodia is an example of a periphery country.  
Semi periphery countries fall into the middle of the economic spectrum. They play 
a major role in mediating economic, political, and social activities that link core 
and peripheral areas. They are generally industrialized countries and allow for 
possibility of innovative technology and reformed social and organizational 
structure, which as a result, may lead the semi periphery countries to become core 
nations. Some ASEAN countries that fall into this category are Singapore, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia (Babones & Alvarez-Rivadulla, 2007).  
To achieve the highest level in the world system hierarchy, Malaysia upholds its 
commitment to ASEAN cooperation. In today‟s globalization and as a small state, 
it is difficult for Malaysia to compete with giant countries in the global 
marketplace. Thus, the unity of ASEAN is the best opportunity for Malaysia to 
secure hegemonic power. As a multilateral institution, ASEAN members will 
adjust their own bargaining positions and invest some of their power resources for 
the development of ASEAN. This organization will then contribute to the smooth 
functioning of the global market system (Eichengreen, 1989); and at the same time, 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                    Vol 12, no 3, 2016 
 86 
provides benefits to foreign companies that invest in any one of the member 
countries.  
While involving directly in the ASEAN market, we suggest that corporate 
strategies should calculate the capabilities of ASEAN‟s smart powers and how the 
power may affect firm value. Smart power is a geopolitical mechanism that 
combines hard and soft power of states or institutions (Wilson, 2008). Hard power 
refers to traditional power strategies that focus on military intervention, coercive 
diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce national interests; while soft power 
describes the intangible ways of obtaining hegemonic power (Nye 1990). Nye 
defined soft power as the capability in persuading, attracting, and appointing 
people to do what they do not want to do and these strategies are usually associated 
with natural resources, cultural attraction, ideology, and bilateral relations. 
Understanding the smart power of ASEAN is considered an important geopolitical 
mechanism for corporate strategies because it can provide a basic understanding of 
how ASEAN has navigated its geopolitical uncertainty. Any changes in political 
decisions between ASEAN members are expected to affect the value of firms 
especially those segmented throughout ASEAN countries. From the geopolitical 
perspective, the influence is examined in the context of Malaysian public listed 
firms.  
 
3. Theory and Hypothesis Development 
This study applied hegemonic stability theory initiated by Charles Kindleberger, an 
economic historian, as a basic theory for hypothesis development. Hegemonic 
stability theory explains the origin of conflicts and ways to minimize conflicts that 
may occur between countries or a single dominant power when pursuing a 
hegemonic position within the world‟s economic system (Snidal, 1985; Webb & 
Krasner,1989). The highest priority for a hegemonic country is the maximization of 
its economic gains.  
To achieve this objective, most countries will foster ties with their major 
competitors and develop multilateral institutions. Through this institutional 
cooperation, countries have the opportunity to rule both economic and military 
power (Schubert, 2003). Businesses will gain benefit from this alliance. For 
example, they can minimize transaction costs, reduce policy uncertainty, and build 
consistent expectations for economic interactions. Hegemonic stability, however, is 
not easy to sustain because of the conflict of autonomy interest between 
institutional members, which may negatively impact business performance (Salehi, 
Ranjbari et al., 2014). Based on this underlying theory, we hypothesize the 
following:  
H1 ASEAN geopolitics does affect the value of public listed firms in Malaysia. 
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4. Method 
This study used content analysis as the mode of data collection. We gathered 
financial information from the annual reports of active public listed firms in Bursa 
Malaysia from 2009 to 2013. We also used data from the World Development 
Indicators database, image data from multimedia photo gallery, and access from 
the Prime Minister‟s Office links within 2009 – 2013 to measure the smart power 
of the ASEAN cooperation.  
4.1. Data sampling  
We began the sampling procedure by excluding companies from the financial, 
banking, insurance, trust, closed-end funds, and securities sectors since these 
companies are subjected to different regulations compared with those of other 
industries. The data from mining, hotels, and IPC industries were also excluded 
because these companies are not fairly distributed across industries. The procedure 
ended up with 82 companies or 410-year observations over the period of 5 years. 
4.2. Measurement of dependence variables 
This study used Q ratio as a proxy for firm value following the method of Chung 
and Pruitt (1994) as follows: 
Qit = 
it
it
TA
 DEBT + PS + MVE itit
       
 (1) 
Where;  
MVEit = the market value of equity computed as price per share      
multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding. 
PSit  = the liquidating value of preferred stock. 
DEBTit = the value of short-term liabilities net of short-term assets plus the 
book value of long-term debt. 
TAit  = the book value of total assets. 
If the value of Q is greater than 1, it indicates that the firm has a market value that 
is greater than total assets. This means that the higher the value of Q, the higher the 
firm value. 
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4.3. Measurement of independent variables – The smart power ASEAN 
cooperation 
To measure the smart power of the ASEAN cooperation, we based on the 
definition used by most scholars in this area such as Taylor (1994), Cohen (2003), 
Salehi, Ranjbari et al. (2014), in that smart power comprises hard and soft power. 
We use military power as a proxy for hard power strategies and both material 
resources and social power as proxies for soft power strategies.  
4.3.1. Military power  
Military power is a traditional geopolitical power. According to Venier 
(2004), any state that has a dominant maritime power exerts a significant 
political influence globally. Following past studies (see; Venier, 2004; 
Virmani, 2006; Reynaud & Vauday, 2009 and Armijo, Mühlich et al., 
2014), this study used a number of military personnel and military 
expenditures as proxies to military power possessed by ASEAN. Data were 
obtained from the WDI for 2009-2013 and based on the weighted average 
basis by countries listed under the members of ASEAN. 
4.3.2. Material resources 
We followed Nye‟s (1990) soft power approach to explain the power of material 
resources of ASEAN and to define five sub dimensions of material resources as 
shown in Table 1. This table provides details of the proxies for material resources 
of the ASEAN cooperation based on the geopolitical capabilities index. These 
proxies are the most acceptable mechanisms among geopolitical scholars such as 
Armijo et al. (2014), Teixeira and Dias (2013), and Reynaud and Vauday (2009).  
Table 1. Material resources of ASEAN cooperation 
The sub dimensions of 
material resources 
(MR) 
Indicator Index Article / 
source 
1. Natural resources 
(NR) 
Energy use Comprehensive 
National Power Index 
(CNP) 
 
Total natural 
resources rents 
(CCI), (CINC), (CNP)  
Nuclear energy  Nuclear Non 
Proliferation Treaty 
Index (NPT) 
Nuclear 
Energetic 
Agency 
2. Population Size (P) Population Density (CCI), (CINC), (CNP)  
Urban population 
3. Science and 
Technology 
Research and  
development 
(CNP)  
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Capability  (T) expenditure 
Material resources are calculated as follows:  
MRit = NRit + Pit + Tit         (2) 
4.3.3. Social Power 
Based on Flint (2006), social power is state power over social relations, social 
groups, social safety, ideology, and cultural. We limit our study to social 
relationship among political elites as a proxy for social power and to measure the 
uniqueness of the business culture in Malaysia, which is relationship-based 
between politicians and businesses. Political elite is measured as bilateral activities 
between the present Malaysian Prime Minister, Dato „Sri Najib Bin Tun Haji 
Abdul Razak and the heads of all ASEAN countries. 
We obtained the data from reports of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, which can be 
accessed via multimedia photo gallery of the Prime Minister‟s Office. We 
characterized the Prime Minister‟s bilateral activities into four different agendas: 
i. A personal visit to the heads of state of all ASEAN countries to Malaysia. 
ii. A personal visit of the Malaysian Prime Minister to ASEAN countries. 
iii. Conferences or seminars in Malaysia attended by the heads of state of all 
ASEAN members. 
iv. Conferences or seminars conducted in other ASEAN countries attended by 
the Prime Minister of Malaysia. 
The value one (1) is allocated if the above criteria are matched, and zero (0) 
otherwise. 
In order to analyze the influence of the ASEAN cooperation on firm value, we 
matched the country‟s geopolitical score with firm segmentation scores. We 
assumed that, holding firms that have their segmentation in ASEAN countries will 
be more affected compared to firms that that have no segmentation in ASEAN 
countries. A dummy variable of one (1) is used if a firm locates its segment in 
ASEAN countries, and 0 if otherwise. Thus, the formula for ASEAN smart power 
is: 
Gpit = 
it
itit
C
 ) sp*(d
           (3) 
Where; 
Gpit is the potential of ASEAN smart power to impact firm i in year t. spit is the 
smart power score, dit, is the segmentation score, and Cit is the total number of 
ASEAN members. 
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4.3.4. Control variables  
To control firm characteristics, we followed several variables which were widely 
used in earlier studies (e.g. Berger & Ofek, 1995; Brick & Chidambaran, 2010). 
The control variables are:  
ƒ (CONTROL) = β0 + β1TOA + β2 ROA + β3LOA + ε  (4) 
Where; 
Firm size (TOA) = logarithm of total assets 
Profitability (ROA) = EBIT/total assets 
Leverage (LOA) = total debt/total assets 
4.4. Data Analysis 
Descriptive and regression analyses were performed on the data. The equation for 
the regression analysis is: 
Qit = MPit + MRit + SPit + ε                    (5) 
Where; 
Qit  = Firm value 
MPit = Military power 
MRit = Material resources 
SPit = Social power 
ε = Error term 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
The descriptive statistics of the smart power of the ASEAN cooperation and firm 
value are shown in Table 2. Q ratio has a negative mean score of 0.085. The mean 
scores of military power, material resources, and social power are positive at 0.513, 
0.428, and 15.400, respectively. The sub dimension of science and technology 
capability of material resources shows the highest score of 0.490; whereas, the sub 
dimension of a personal visit of the heads of all ASEAN countries to Malaysia 
under social power shows the highest mean score of 4.600. The descriptive results 
raises the question of whether the smart power of the ASEAN cooperation has a 
negative influence on the value of Malaysian public listed firms. This evidence has 
an interesting implication requiring further regression analysis. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Mean 
score 
Dependence variables:  
Q ratio -0.085 
  Independence variables:  
Military power (MP) 0.513 
  Material resources (MR) 0.428 
Natural resources (NR) 0.406 
Population size (P) 0.389 
Science and technology capability (T) 0.490 
  Social power (SR) 15.400 
A personal visit of the heads all ASEAN countries to Malaysia (PH) 4.600 
A personal visit of the Prime Minister of Malaysia to ASEAN countries 
(PM) 
4.000 
Conferences or seminars in Malaysia,  
 attended by the heads all ASEAN countries (CH) 
 
2.000 
Conferences or seminars conducting in other ASEAN countries, 
 attended by the Prime Minister of Malaysia (CM) 
 
4.200 
  Control variables:  
Firm size (TOA) 8.861 
Profitability (ROA) 0.010 
Leverage (LOA) 0.529 
 
5.2. Regression Analysis 
This section shows how the smart power of the ASEAN cooperation affects firm 
value. Q ratio was used as a proxy for firm value. We developed a panel regression 
model and the statistics were adjusted for heteroskedasticity analysis. The analysis 
began with pooled OLS regression and fixed-effects model. We conducted a 
poolability test to ensure good and reliable estimates of the parameters of the 
model. The results of the fixed-effects model show that all αi are zero, which 
means that the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent. Thus, the null hypothesis 
is rejected, while the presence of individual effects is accepted. The Hausman test 
(see Figure 1) was then conducted to verify the presence of correlations between 
the unobservable heterogeneity and explanatory variables.  
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Figure 1. Hausman test 
Based on the results of the Hausman Test shown by Figure 1, the probability is less 
than 0.05. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected, and the fixed-effects regression 
model is continued. Figure 2 shows the results of Fixed-Effects (within) Regression 
Model. 
 
Figure 2. Fixed-effects (within) regression model 
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       44.09
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         loa      .5312949     .5633141       -.0320192        .0054113
         roa      .0812524     .0649911        .0162613               .
         toa     -.2489857    -.1378878       -.1110979        .0155948
 SocialPower     -.0009321    -.0003496       -.0005826               .
MaterialRe~s      .5681628    -.0770633        .6452261        .1535423
MilitaryPo~r      .2273027     .0238083        .2034944        .3727091
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
F test that all u_i=0:     F(81, 322) =    17.80             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                                 
            rho    .95005678   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
        sigma_e    .06167935
        sigma_u    .26901489
                                                                                 
          _cons     1.493474   .2223812     6.72   0.000     1.055971    1.930978
            loa     .5312949   .0259185    20.50   0.000     .4803039    .5822859
            roa     .0812524   .0160622     5.06   0.000     .0496524    .1128524
            toa    -.2489857   .0197165   -12.63   0.000    -.2877751   -.2101964
    SocialPower    -.0009321    .000834    -1.12   0.265    -.0025728    .0007086
MaterialResou~s     .5681628   .1921523     2.96   0.003     .1901304    .9461953
  MilitaryPower     .2273027   .3888927     0.58   0.559    -.5377887    .9923941
                                                                                 
              Q        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7468                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,322)           =    234.96
       overall = 0.2357                                        max =         5
       between = 0.1444                                        avg =       5.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.8141                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: no                              Number of groups   =        82
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       410
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The estimated standard deviation of αi (sigma_u) is 0.269. The value is larger than 
the standard deviation of εit (sigma_e) which is 0.062. This finding suggests that 
the individual-specific component of the error is more important than the 
idiosyncratic error. The standard error component model assumes that the 
regression disturbances are homoskedastic. 
To ensure the validity of the statistical results, a modified Wald test was conducted 
for the group-wise heteroskedasticity in the Fixed Effects Model. The serial 
correlation was also tested using the xtserial command implemented by David 
Drukker. The results (p < 0.05) indicate that the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity is rejected. The probability of serial correlation for our model is 
F= 0.0000, which indicates that the errors are auto correlated.  
For the two problems of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, the xtscc 
command implemented by Daniel Hoechle was used to adjust the standard errors of 
the coefficient estimates for possible dependence in the residuals because the xtscc, 
fe performs fixed-effects (within) regression with Driscoll and Kraay standard 
errors. The error structure has been assumed to be heteroskedastic, auto correlated 
up to some lag, and correlated between groups. Figure 3 shows the results of fixed-
effects (within) regression with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. 
Figure 3. Fixed- effect (within) regression with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors 
Based on the results, we derived an econometric model of the smart power of 
ASEAN geopolitics and firm value as follows: 
Qit = 1.493 + 0.568MRit - 0.001SPit – 0.249TOAit + 0.081ROAit + 0.531LOAit  (6) 
The equation model value shows that material resources (MR) displayed positive 
and low estimated coefficients of 0.568 at significance level of p < 0.10. The social 
power (SR) is negatively correlated with firm value at the significance level of 
                                                                                 
          _cons     1.493474   .3375496     4.42   0.011     .5562863    2.430662
            loa     .5312949   .0354002    15.01   0.000     .4330081    .6295817
            roa     .0812524   .0218992     3.71   0.021     .0204505    .1420542
            toa    -.2489857   .0473933    -5.25   0.006    -.3805707   -.1174007
    SocialPower    -.0009321   .0003915    -2.38   0.076     -.002019    .0001548
MeterialResou~s     .5681628   .2331074     2.44   0.071     -.079047    1.215373
  MilitaryPower     .2273027   .2417435     0.94   0.400    -.4438849    .8984903
                                                                                 
              Q        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Drisc/Kraay
                                                                                 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.8141
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): no                           F(  6,     4)     =  12307.12
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        82
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       410
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10% with the coefficient value of 0.001. As a proxy for hard power of ASEAN 
geopolitics, military power fails to exhibit any significant relationship with firm 
value. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that ASEAN geopolitics has an 
influence on firm value, but only its soft power.  
5.3. Robustness check 
Our main analysis using Q ratio as a measure for firm value shows that the soft 
power of ASEAN geopolitics influences firm value at low significant results of 
10%. To confirm our model, we checked the robustness of our results by using an 
alternative measure of firm value. We used value added intellectual coefficient 
(VAIC
TM
) model developed by Pulic (1998), a model commonly used in estimating 
non-financial value of firms. VAIC
TM 
is the composite sum of three indicators 
formally termed as follows:  
Capital employed efficiency (CEE) – indicator of the value added efficiency of 
capital employed. 
Human capital efficiency (HCE) – indicator of the value added efficiency of human 
capital.  
Structural capital efficiency (SCE) – indicator of the value added efficiency of 
structural capital.  
VAIC
TM
 is calculated by the following equation: 
VAIC
TM
 = CEE + HCE + SCE         (7) 
Where;  
VAIC
TM
 = ICE + CEE 
ICE = HCE + SCE 
HCE  = Value added (VA) / Human capital (HC) 
SCE  = Structural capital (SC) / Value added (VA) 
CEE  = Value added (VA) / Capital employed (CE) 
VA  = Operating profit (OP) + Employee cost (EC) + Depreciation (D) + 
Amortization (A) 
HC  = Total investment for salary and wages for firm i 
SC  = VA – HC 
CE  = book value of the net assets for firm i 
Different control variables were used to examine the relationship between the 
smart power of the ASEAN cooperation and VAIC, thereby ensuring the precision 
of the results. The control variables used are firm size (logarithm of total assets), 
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returns on equity (EBIT/total shareholders‟ equity), leverage (total debt/total 
assets), dividend yield (cash dividends paid/total shareholder equity), and R&D 
sensitivity (dummy variables). 
The same procedure was used to run the regression analysis. Figure 4 shows that 
material resources and social power are significantly related to non-financial value 
of a firm (VAIC) at 1% to 5% significant levels, respectively. The results show 
similar patterns with the earlier reported results with Q measure for firm value. 
  
 
Figure 4. Robustness check - the influence of ASEAN cooperation on VAIC 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between ASEAN 
geopolitics and the value of public listed firms in Malaysia. Our results show that 
ASEAN geopolitics does to some extent influence the value of public listed firms 
in Malaysia. However, only the soft power of ASEAN geopolitics, namely material 
resources and social power exert a significant influence on firm value. The hard 
power of ASEAN geopolitics on the other hand does not correlate with firm value. 
Based on these findings, we suggest that corporate strategies should exploit the soft 
power of the ASEAN cooperation as an important mechanism for corporate 
decision making. Specifically, they have to utilize the benefits of material 
resources and be aware of social power risks. We recommend that the Malaysian 
government reviews bilateral activities of political elites for the benefit of 
Malaysian public listed companies which are actively traded in ASEAN countries. 
Finally, we suggest that the government reviews the extent of military power of the 
ASEAN cooperation in order to benefit the firms. This is because according to 
. 
                                                                                 
          _cons     6.601068   7.148622     0.92   0.408    -13.24669    26.44882
            loa    -5.413783   .3015288   -17.95   0.000    -6.250961   -4.576605
  rdsensitivity    -2.440911   .5737105    -4.25   0.013    -4.033787   -.8480353
       divyield    -5.598025   .7683934    -7.29   0.002    -7.731427   -3.464623
            roe     1.419098   .3656011     3.88   0.018     .4040261    2.434169
            toa    -.9719057   1.003588    -0.97   0.388    -3.758312    1.814501
    SocialPower    -.0459182   .0089937    -5.11   0.007    -.0708887   -.0209476
MaterialResou~s     22.45794   7.284764     3.08   0.037     2.232191    42.68368
  MilitaryPower    -1.157873   2.177001    -0.53   0.623    -7.202198    4.886451
                                                                                 
           vaic        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Drisc/Kraay
                                                                                 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.1214
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): no                           F(  8,     4)     =    366.16
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        82
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       410
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Nossel (2004), soft power or military power per se, is not the best strategy for 
achieving hegemonic power, but the combination of those powers is the most 
important strategy in the geopolitical agenda.  
This study makes several noteworthy contributions to geopolitics and finance 
literature. Firstly, it introduces the combination of geopolitics and finance 
disciplines in one study. This new method should be used widely in future 
research. Secondly, the empirical findings of this study provide a new 
understanding of the effects of the ASEAN cooperation on the value of Malaysian 
public listed firms. Finally, we provide panel data analysis of five years, which is 
able to analyze the geopolitical condition and firm performance during Dato „Sri 
Najib Bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak service as the Prime Minister of Malaysia. 
However, our study is not without its limits. In this study, we did not measure the 
direct impact of the ASEAN cooperation on firm segmentation value. Thus, it is 
recommended this limitation be addressed in any future research.  
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